Privacy shield
What personal data is kept from model providers, and the record of what was masked
On this page(20 sections)
- The privacy shield and what it covers
- Change the privacy shield
- What the privacy shield did lately
- Words a conversation's model never read
- Read tokens back to their values
- An image before and after masking
- The name lists the shield finds names by
- Try the shield on a text
- The datasets taught to the shield
- Teach the shield a dataset's values
- Personal data that reached a provider unmasked, and the proposals to catch more like it
- Report a value the shield should have masked
- Confirm or dismiss a leak
- Look for leaks in recent conversations, on this machine
- Measure rules and name-list words before proposing them
- Propose rules and name-list words to the owner
- Apply a hardening proposal to the policy
- Dismiss a hardening proposal
- Note the hardening session started from the page
- Forget a taught dataset
The shield replaces names, numbers and other personal data with tokens before a request reaches a provider you have not trusted, and puts the real values back on the way out. These routes read its state and replace its policy, which only the owner may do; read the log of what it masked; look a word up in the name dictionary; and list, teach and forget the datasets of known values it masks wherever they appear.
20 calls. Pick one to open it, or use the list on the right.
GET/privacy/shieldThe privacy shield and what it covers
Whether personal data is kept from untrusted model providers, which providers are trusted, which local readers are installed, and how many values it has learned.
What you send
Nothing. Call it as it is.
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
policy | object |
modeWhether the shield is off, only… | "off" | "watch" | "on" |
trustedProviders that may read personal data… | string[] |
classesWhich kinds of personal data are… | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9)[] |
imagesWhat an image bound for an… | "mask" | "allow" |
namesHow names are found | "dictionary" | "model" |
allowValues never masked: your own company,… | string[] |
conversationsProviders that may read one conversation's… | object[] |
conversationId | string |
providerProvider id, as the trusted list… | string |
dictionaryThe name dictionary as the owner… | object |
offBuilt-in name lists switched off, by… | string[] |
listsThe owner's own name lists, read… | object[] |
id | string |
title | string |
kind | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) |
matching | "inflected" | "as-written" |
wordsOne word each, in any case:… | string[] |
on | boolean |
rulesThe owner's own rules: words, phrases… | object[] |
id | string |
title | string |
on | boolean |
classThe kind what it matches is… | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
match | "terms" | "pattern" |
terms | string[] |
pattern | string |
matchCase | boolean |
knownValues taught from your datasets, matched… | integer |
tokensValues the shield has given a… | integer |
readers | object |
ocrThe local text reader (PaddleOCR) that… | boolean |
modelA local named-entity model for names… | boolean |
providers | object[] |
idProvider id, as the trusted list… | string |
label | string |
shieldableThe shield can read what its… | boolean |
localIt runs on this machine, so… | boolean |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/shield" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.status();POST/privacy/shieldChange the privacy shield
Replaces the policy whole. Turning the shield on puts every turn that starts from then on, whose runtime can be shielded, behind the gateway, and refuses the turns that cannot be shielded on an untrusted provider; a turn already running keeps the route it started with. A change to what is masked or trusted holds from the next model request.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
modeWhether the shield is off, only… | "off" | "watch" | "on" | body |
trustedProviders that may read personal data… | string[] | body |
classesWhich kinds of personal data are… | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9)[] | body |
imagesWhat an image bound for an… | "mask" | "allow" | body |
namesHow names are found | "dictionary" | "model" | body |
allowValues never masked: your own company,… | string[] | body |
conversationsProviders that may read one conversation's… | object[] | body |
conversationIdrequired | string | body |
providerrequiredProvider id, as the trusted list… | string | body |
dictionaryThe name dictionary as the owner… | object | body |
offBuilt-in name lists switched off, by… | string[] | body |
listsThe owner's own name lists, read… | object[] | body |
idrequired | string | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
kindrequired | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) | body |
matching | "inflected" | "as-written" | body |
wordsOne word each, in any case:… | string[] | body |
on | boolean | body |
rulesThe owner's own rules: words, phrases… | object[] | body |
idrequired | string | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
on | boolean | body |
classrequiredThe kind what it matches is… | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) | body |
matchrequired | "terms" | "pattern" | body |
terms | string[] | body |
pattern | string | body |
matchCase | boolean | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
okAlways true | true |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/shield" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"mode":"off","trusted":["…","…"],"classes":["person-name","national-id"],"images":"mask","names":"dictionary","allow":["…","…"],"conversations":[{"conversationId":"nightly-changelog","provider":"claude"},{"conversationId":"release-notes","provider":"claude"}],"dictionary":{"off":["…","…"],"lists":[{"id":"a1b2c3d4","title":"Update the changelog","kind":"first-name","matching":"inflected","words":["…","…"],"on":true},{"id":"e5f6a7b8","title":"Draft the release notes","kind":"surname","matching":"as-written","words":["…","…"],"on":true}]},"rules":[{"id":"a1b2c3d4","title":"Update the changelog","on":true,"class":"person-name","match":"terms","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false},{"id":"e5f6a7b8","title":"Draft the release notes","on":true,"class":"national-id","match":"pattern","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false}]}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.setPolicy({
"mode": "off",
"trusted": [
"…",
"…"
],
"classes": [
"person-name",
"national-id"
],
"images": "mask",
"names": "dictionary",
"allow": [
"…",
"…"
],
"conversations": [
{
"conversationId": "nightly-changelog",
"provider": "claude"
},
{
"conversationId": "release-notes",
"provider": "claude"
}
],
"dictionary": {
"off": [
"…",
"…"
],
"lists": [
{
"id": "a1b2c3d4",
"title": "Update the changelog",
"kind": "first-name",
"matching": "inflected",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"on": true
},
{
"id": "e5f6a7b8",
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"kind": "surname",
"matching": "as-written",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"on": true
}
]
},
"rules": [
{
"id": "a1b2c3d4",
"title": "Update the changelog",
"on": true,
"class": "person-name",
"match": "terms",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
},
{
"id": "e5f6a7b8",
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"on": true,
"class": "national-id",
"match": "pattern",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
}
]
});GET/privacy/logWhat the privacy shield did lately
Each model request the gateway handled: which provider, whether it was trusted, how many of each kind of personal data it found, and the tokens it gave with the masked text around them. Never the values.
What you send
Nothing. Call it as it is.
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
atWhen, as an ISO timestamp | string |
conversationId | string |
provider | string |
trusted | boolean |
action | "masked" | "watched" | "passed" | "refused" |
countsHow many of each kind were… | object |
imagesImages the shield changed: personal data… | integer |
documentsDocuments read here: a PDF sent… | integer |
protocolWhich wire format the request spoke | string |
detailWhy it was refused, when it… | string |
replacementsThe first values replaced in what… | object[] |
tokenThe token the value became, as… | string |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
excerptThe masked text around the token… | string |
imageFound in an image's text, so… | boolean |
imageIdThe image it was painted over,… | string |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/log" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.log();GET/privacy/shieldedWords a conversation's model never read
The values in the conversation's replies that its model wrote as tokens, each with the token it wrote, so the chat can tell them from the model's own words. Empty while the shield does not mask the conversation's provider. Only someone who can read the conversation may ask.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
conversationIdrequired | string | query |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
textThe value as it stands in… | string |
tokenWhat the model read and wrote… | string |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/shielded?conversationId=nightly-changelog" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.shielded({
"conversationId": "nightly-changelog"
});POST/privacy/revealRead tokens back to their values
The value each token stands for, from the vault, so the owner can check what the shield masked and spot a value it should have left alone. Only the owner may ask; a token the vault never gave out is left out.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
tokensrequired | string[] | body |
What comes back
A plain value rather than an object. The example below is the whole of it.
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/reveal" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"tokens":["ict_9wQ4rTz8kLmN3pXbV7hJ","ict_9wQ4rTz8kLmN3pXbV7hJ"]}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.reveal({
"tokens": [
"ict_9wQ4rTz8kLmN3pXbV7hJ",
"ict_9wQ4rTz8kLmN3pXbV7hJ"
]
});POST/privacy/imageAn image before and after masking
The picture as it was and as the shield painted it before it left, for a log entry's image replacement. The picture before holds the personal data, so only the owner may ask. Only the most recent images are kept; an older one answers not found.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
idrequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
atWhen it was first painted, as… | string |
before | object |
mediaType | string |
dataBase64 | string |
after | object |
mediaType | string |
dataBase64 | string |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/image" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"id":"a1b2c3d4"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.image({
"id": "a1b2c3d4"
});GET/privacy/dictionaryThe name lists the shield finds names by
Every list the dictionary holds (first names, surnames, words that are names only beside other evidence, titles), the owner's own lists among them, whether each is switched on, how many words each has and where they come from. With a query, what the dictionary as the owner set it makes of it as a name, and for one word the listed words starting with it.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
queryA word, the start of one,… | string | query |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
lists | object[] |
idStable id of the list | string |
kindWhat a word on it says… | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) |
languagesThe languages its words come from;… | "pl" | "en" | "multi"[] |
countHow many words it holds | integer |
matchinginflected: matched in every grammatical form… | "inflected" | "as-written" |
sourceWhere the words come from: the… | string |
urlThe source's page, where it has… | string |
license | string |
onRead by the shield; the owner… | boolean |
ownOne of the owner's own lists… | boolean |
titleAn own list's title | string |
totalsDistinct words across the first-name lists,… | object |
firstNames | integer |
surnames | integer |
matches | object[] |
word | string |
listsIds of the lists holding it | string[] |
lookup | object |
textThe query as a name is… | string |
foundWhether the dictionary alone masks it… | boolean |
words | object[] |
word | string |
firstNameA listed first name, in this… | boolean |
surnameA listed surname, in this form… | boolean |
surnameFormShaped like a Polish surname (-ski,… | boolean |
ambiguousAlso an ordinary word in some… | boolean |
neverNever taken as part of a… | boolean |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/dictionary" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.dictionary();POST/privacy/previewTry the shield on a text
What the shield would mask in the text with the policy as saved (every detector, the name lists, the owner's own rules, the values the vault knows) and what found each. Nothing is given a token or kept, whatever the switch says.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
textrequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
spans | object[] |
start | integer |
endExclusive | integer |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
bydetector: the built-in detectors and name… | "detector" | "rule" | "learned" | "model" |
ruleThe id of the owner's rule… | string |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/preview" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"text":"export const start = () => listen(PORT);\n"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.preview({
"text": "export const start = () => listen(PORT);\n"
});GET/privacy/knownThe datasets taught to the shield
Each source values were taught from, and how many. The values themselves are never sent back.
What you send
Nothing. Call it as it is.
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
sourceWhere the values came from, as… | string |
count | integer |
atWhen they were last taught | string |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/known" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.sources();POST/privacy/knownTeach the shield a dataset's values
Each value is masked wherever it appears from now on, in every form it is written, whether or not the detectors would have found it. Teaching only ever masks more, so the agent may do it.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
sourcerequiredWhere the values came from: a… | string | body |
valuesrequired | object[] | body |
valuerequired | string | body |
classrequired | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
added | integer |
known | integer |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/known" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"source":"…","values":[{"value":"…","class":"person-name"},{"value":"…","class":"national-id"}]}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.learn({
"source": "…",
"values": [
{
"value": "…",
"class": "person-name"
},
{
"value": "…",
"class": "national-id"
}
]
});GET/privacy/leaksPersonal data that reached a provider unmasked, and the proposals to catch more like it
Every reported or suspected leak with its outline, the field label before it, what the name lists say of its words and what finds it now without its exact copy in the vault; and the hardening proposals waiting for the owner. Values and the text around them only for a person who runs the shield, or an agent whose conversation runs on a trusted or local provider.
What you send
Nothing. Call it as it is.
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
leaks | object[] |
id | string |
at | string |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
origin | "reported" | "scan" |
state | "suspected" | "confirmed" | "dismissed" |
why | string |
conversationId | string |
outlineThe value with each capital as… | string |
length | integer |
labelUp to four words just before… | string |
wordsEach word of the value, in… | object[] |
outlineThe word with each capital as… | string |
firstName | boolean |
surname | boolean |
surnameFormShaped like a Polish surname (-ski,… | boolean |
ambiguousAlso an ordinary word in some… | boolean |
never | boolean |
caughtWhat finds it now with the… | "rule" | "detector" | "model" | "no" |
valueOnly for someone who may read… | string |
contextOnly for someone who may read… | string |
proposals | object[] |
id | string |
at | string |
conversationId | string |
title | string |
why | string |
hardening | object |
rules | object[] |
title | string |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
match | "terms" | "pattern" |
terms | string[] |
pattern | string |
matchCase | boolean |
lists | object[] |
title | string |
kind | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) |
matching | "inflected" | "as-written" |
words | string[] |
fromLeaks | object[] |
measured | object |
leaks | object |
totalConfirmed leaks measured against | integer |
beforeCaught by the policy as saved,… | integer |
afterCaught with the additions | integer |
missedIds of the confirmed leaks still… | string[] |
control | object |
conversations | integer |
chars | integer |
addedValues the additions would mask there… | integer |
samples | object[] |
problemsRules that cannot be saved as… | string[] |
words | object |
revealedWhether this reader is shown values:… | boolean |
sessionThe hardening session last started from… | object |
conversationId | string |
at | string |
curl "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN"import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.leaks();POST/privacy/leaksReport a value the shield should have masked
Kept as a confirmed leak, and its exact value taught to the vault: masked wherever it appears from now on. Reporting only ever masks more, so the agent may do it.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
valuerequired | string | body |
classrequired | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) | body |
contextThe text it stood in; the… | string | body |
conversationId | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
id | string |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"value":"…","class":"person-name","context":"…","conversationId":"nightly-changelog"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.report({
"value": "…",
"class": "person-name",
"context": "…",
"conversationId": "nightly-changelog"
});POST/privacy/leaks/judgeConfirm or dismiss a leak
Confirming teaches its exact value to the vault, so it is masked from now on. Dismissing says it is no personal data: a value taught for it is forgotten, and a scan does not suggest it again.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
idrequired | string | body |
staterequired | "confirmed" | "dismissed" | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
okAlways true | true |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks/judge" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"id":"a1b2c3d4","state":"confirmed"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.judge({
"id": "a1b2c3d4",
"state": "confirmed"
});POST/privacy/leaks/scanLook for leaks in recent conversations, on this machine
Reads the most recent conversations here and suspects every value nothing masks that the local name model reads as a name, or that stands under a field labelled as personal data (PESEL, passport, e-mail…). Nothing leaves this machine and nothing is taught: the owner confirms or dismisses each.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
conversations | integer | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
conversations | integer |
chars | integer |
suspected | integer |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks/scan" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"conversations":1}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.scan({
"conversations": 1
});POST/privacy/leaks/tryMeasure rules and name-list words before proposing them
Adds them to the policy as saved and measures, on this machine: how many confirmed leaks they catch that nothing catches now, and what they would mask in recent conversations that nothing masks today, as outlines (values only for a reader who may read them). Nothing is saved.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
rules | object[] | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
classrequired | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) | body |
matchrequired | "terms" | "pattern" | body |
terms | string[] | body |
pattern | string | body |
matchCase | boolean | body |
lists | object[] | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
kindrequired | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) | body |
matching | "inflected" | "as-written" | body |
words | string[] | body |
fromLeaks | object[] | body |
leakrequired | string | body |
wordrequired | integer | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
leaks | object |
totalConfirmed leaks measured against | integer |
beforeCaught by the policy as saved,… | integer |
afterCaught with the additions | integer |
missedIds of the confirmed leaks still… | string[] |
control | object |
conversations | integer |
chars | integer |
addedValues the additions would mask there… | integer |
samples | object[] |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
outline | string |
label | string |
valueOnly for someone who may read… | string |
problemsRules that cannot be saved as… | string[] |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks/try" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"rules":[{"title":"Update the changelog","class":"person-name","match":"terms","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false},{"title":"Draft the release notes","class":"national-id","match":"pattern","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false}],"lists":[{"title":"Update the changelog","kind":"first-name","matching":"inflected","words":["…","…"],"fromLeaks":[{"leak":"…","word":0},{"leak":"…","word":0}]},{"title":"Draft the release notes","kind":"surname","matching":"as-written","words":["…","…"],"fromLeaks":[{"leak":"…","word":0},{"leak":"…","word":0}]}]}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.tryHardening({
"rules": [
{
"title": "Update the changelog",
"class": "person-name",
"match": "terms",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
},
{
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"class": "national-id",
"match": "pattern",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
}
],
"lists": [
{
"title": "Update the changelog",
"kind": "first-name",
"matching": "inflected",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"fromLeaks": [
{
"leak": "…",
"word": 0
},
{
"leak": "…",
"word": 0
}
]
},
{
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"kind": "surname",
"matching": "as-written",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"fromLeaks": [
{
"leak": "…",
"word": 0
},
{
"leak": "…",
"word": 0
}
]
}
]
});POST/privacy/proposalsPropose rules and name-list words to the owner
Measured as tryHardening measures them, and kept for the owner, who applies or dismisses it on the privacy page. A rule whose pattern cannot be saved is refused here.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
titlerequired | string | body |
why | string | body |
hardeningrequired | object | body |
rules | object[] | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
classrequired | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) | body |
matchrequired | "terms" | "pattern" | body |
terms | string[] | body |
pattern | string | body |
matchCase | boolean | body |
lists | object[] | body |
titlerequired | string | body |
kindrequired | "first-name" | "surname" | "ambiguous" | "title" … (5) | body |
matching | "inflected" | "as-written" | body |
words | string[] | body |
fromLeaks | object[] | body |
leakrequired | string | body |
wordrequired | integer | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
id | string |
measured | object |
leaks | object |
totalConfirmed leaks measured against | integer |
beforeCaught by the policy as saved,… | integer |
afterCaught with the additions | integer |
missedIds of the confirmed leaks still… | string[] |
control | object |
conversations | integer |
chars | integer |
addedValues the additions would mask there… | integer |
samples | object[] |
class | "person-name" | "national-id" | "tax-id" | "identity-document" … (9) |
outline | string |
label | string |
valueOnly for someone who may read… | string |
problemsRules that cannot be saved as… | string[] |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/proposals" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"title":"Update the changelog","why":"","hardening":{"rules":[{"title":"Update the changelog","class":"person-name","match":"terms","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false},{"title":"Draft the release notes","class":"national-id","match":"pattern","terms":["…","…"],"pattern":"","matchCase":false}],"lists":[{"title":"Update the changelog","kind":"first-name","matching":"inflected","words":["…","…"],"fromLeaks":[{},{}]},{"title":"Draft the release notes","kind":"surname","matching":"as-written","words":["…","…"],"fromLeaks":[{},{}]}]}}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.propose({
"title": "Update the changelog",
"why": "",
"hardening": {
"rules": [
{
"title": "Update the changelog",
"class": "person-name",
"match": "terms",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
},
{
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"class": "national-id",
"match": "pattern",
"terms": [
"…",
"…"
],
"pattern": "",
"matchCase": false
}
],
"lists": [
{
"title": "Update the changelog",
"kind": "first-name",
"matching": "inflected",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"fromLeaks": [
{},
{}
]
},
{
"title": "Draft the release notes",
"kind": "surname",
"matching": "as-written",
"words": [
"…",
"…"
],
"fromLeaks": [
{},
{}
]
}
]
}
});POST/privacy/proposals/applyApply a hardening proposal to the policy
Its rules are added and switched on, and its words go onto the owner's own list of the same title and kind, or a new one; a word named by its leak is read from that leak here.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
idrequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
okAlways true | true |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/proposals/apply" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"id":"a1b2c3d4"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.applyProposal({
"id": "a1b2c3d4"
});POST/privacy/proposals/dismissDismiss a hardening proposal
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
idrequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
okAlways true | true |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/proposals/dismiss" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"id":"a1b2c3d4"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.dismissProposal({
"id": "a1b2c3d4"
});POST/privacy/leaks/sessionNote the hardening session started from the page
So the page offers to open it rather than starting a second one while it is still on the board.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
conversationIdrequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
okAlways true | true |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/leaks/session" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"conversationId":"nightly-changelog"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.hardeningSession({
"conversationId": "nightly-changelog"
});POST/privacy/known/forgetForget a taught dataset
Stops matching the values taught from one source. Tokens already given to them still resolve, so earlier conversations keep reading right.
What you send
| Field | Type | Where |
|---|---|---|
sourcerequired | string | body |
What comes back
| Field | Type |
|---|---|
forgotten | integer |
curl -X POST "$SANDBOX/privacy/known/forget" \
-H "x-intentic-control: $INTENTIC_TOKEN" \
-H "content-type: application/json" \
-d '{"source":"…"}'import { sandbox } from "@intentic/sandbox-client";
const result = await sandbox.privacy.forget({
"source": "…"
});